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ARE BANKRUPTS CRIMINALS? *
SAMUEL C. DUBEESTEIN -
D URING the discussion period following an address onbankruptcy delivered by me at a recent meeting of the
local Federal Grand Jurors Association, one of its members
posed the rather curious and provocative' question, "Are
bankrupts criminals?" While this question was then an-
swered briefly, I felt that its implication deserved more
serious consideration, eventually giving rise to this discus-
sion with its odd title.
History informs us that in ancient times a debtor who
was unable to pay his debts was considered a felon or a
virtual slave of his creditors. In certain instances the un-
fortunate debtor suffered the penalty of capital punishment.
Later a more enlightened view eliminated the death penalty,
but still the debtor was dragged to prison, from which he
could be released only upon the payment of his debts. Early
English bankruptcy laws were quasi-criminal in their nature.
and the bankrupt-debtor was referred to as "the offender."
In colonial days, a delinquent debtor was thrown into a
debtors' prison. Perhaps it is not generally known that
Robert Morris, the patriot whose financial aid saved ma-
terially the Continental Army in the Revolutionary War and
who signed both the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution, was confined in the Prune Street Debtors'
Prison in Philadelphia for three years because he was unable
to pay his debts following the loss of his fortune. Likewise,
James Wilson, while a Justice of the United States Supreme
Court, fled the jurisdiction of the State of Pennsylvania to
avoid the action of hostile creditors who were seeking to
*Address delivered before Referees Association at its Conference in
Tulsa, Oklahoma, October 3, 1950.
t United States Referee in Bankruptcy and Member of the Faculty,
St. John's University School of Law.
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lodge him in a debtors' prison when the learned jurist met
with unexpected financial reverses.
But there was an awakening. The enslavement or im-
prisonment of an honest but unfortunate debtor was not
considered legitimate, conscionable or proper. The authors
of the Constitution were men of deep religious faith who
were acquainted with the Bible, and who knew of the Lord's
Release in Deuteronomy Chapter 15, the Golden Rule of
doing unto others as we would they should do unto us, the
lofty and inspiring appeal "Come unto me all ye that labor
and are heavy laden and I will give you rest," and the prac-
tical idealism of "Love is the fulfilling of the law." They
must have known that human law is right only as it patterns
the divine.
It was therefore not unreasonable to expect that our
Constitution would provide-as it does-that:
the Congress shall have power . . . to establish . . . uniform laws
on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.1
Congress, in enacting bankruptcy laws, which now include
debtor-relief laws, sought, from time to timd, to establish a
stable business and social economy in order to curtail the
tremendous annual debt losses, and evinced a real interest in
the economic rebirth of the honest insolvent debtor in order
to maintain and sustain the dignity of man. The rehabilita-
tion of an individual and his reinstatement in the business
world, is the theme that runs through the bankruptcy statute.
The United States Supreme Court 2 has expressed in
clear terms that the "bankruptcy power" in the Constitution
is flexible enough to serve the varying economic and social
needs of changing generations and conditions; and one of the
beneficent features of the bankruptcy law is the privilege
granted to those bankrupts, who have surrendered their
property and otherwise complied with the duties imposed
I U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
2 Continental Illinois National Bank v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 294 U. S.
648 (1935). The economic history of our country teaches us that following
a depression or panic, appeals are inevitably made to Congress for the enact-
ment of laws on "the subject of bankruptcies." We have passed through about
twenty major depressions; and the alternating booms and panics have pre-
sented acute distressing problems to business men, wage earners, bankers and
Congress.
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upon them, to receive a discharge 3 of their provable debts
with certain exceptions. 4
Despite the kindly reference to the treatment accorded
debtors under the bankruptcy law, it should be borne in mind
that the statute also contains provisions for the denial of a
dishonest bankrupt's discharge and for the indictment and
prosecution of crooked bankrupts and their confederates.5
For the purpose of this address it is only necessary to
refer to the first ground of objection to a bankrupt's dis-
charge which is set forth in Section 14c (1) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. That section provides that the court shall grant
a discharge unless "the bankrupt has committed an offense
punishable by imprisonment under Title 18, United States
Code, Section 152." 6
Until recently the various crimes relating to bankruptcy
were to be found in Section 29 of the Bankruptcy Act
(United States Code, Title 11, Section 52). By the Act of
June 25, 1948, as amended by the Act of May 24, 1949 7 the
provisions of Section 29 of the Bankruptcy Act were repealed
and incorporated in Title 18, United States Code,8 but any
rights or liabilities eisting under the repealed provisions
were preserved.9
Section 152, Title 18, United States Code, 10 refers to the
several offenses relating to bankruptcy, punishable by im-
prisonment, any one of which, if established, will bar a
bankrupt's discharge. Succinctly stated, the offenses are:
(a) fraudulent concealment of assets of a bankrupt estate; 1"
3 BANKR. AcT § 14, 11 U. S. C. § 32 (1927).
4BANKPR AcT § 17, 11 U. S. C. §35 (1927).
5 Persons who commit bankruptcy offenses punishable under the law and
also those persons who aid or induce the commission of any offense defined in
any law of the United States, are guilty of a felony warranting their indict-
ment as a principal, and not as a mere, accessory to the crime. 18 U. S. C.
§2 (1948).
r BANKR. AcT § 14c(1), 11 U. S. C. § 32(b) (1927).
7Pub. L. No. 72, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (May 24, 1949).
8 18 U. S. C. §§ 151-155 (1948).
9 1 U. S. C § 109 (1947); United States v. Lynch, 180 F. 2d 696 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U. S. 981 (1950); In re Cole, 88 F. Supp. 842 (E. D.
N. Y. 1950).
10 Formerly Section 29 of the Bankruptcy Act.
r1 Noell v. United States, 183 F. 2d 334 (9th Cir. 1950) (presumption of
continued possession) ; In re Lenoble, 182 F. 2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1950) (conceal-
ment of bank accounts); United States v. Wodiska, 147 F. 2d 38 (2d Cir.),
57 Am. B. R. (N.s.) 327 (1945); Coghlan v. United States, 147 F. 2d 233
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(b) making a false oath or account; 12 (c) presenting a
false claim for proof; 13 (d) receiving property from a bank-
rupt after bankruptcy with intent to defeat the bankruptcy
law; 14 (e) giving, offering, receiving or attempting to obtain
money, property or advantage for acting or forbearing to act
in any bankruptcy proceeding 15 (note that now both the
person who gives as well as the person who receives is guilty
of the offense) ; (f) transferring or concealing property of
any person or corporation in contemplation of such person's
or corporation's bankruptcy or with intent to defeat the
bankruptcy law; 16 (g) concealing, destroying or falsifying
(8th Cir.), 57 Am. B. R. (N.s.) 331 (1945) (attorney charged with inten-
tionally failing to disclose debtor's assets in schedules prepared by him) ; United
States v. Tatcher, 131 F. 2d 1002 (3d Cir.), 52 Am. B. R. (N.s.) 120 (1942)
(record insufficient to sustain concealment charge); United States v. Agresti,
130 F. 2d 152 (2d Cir.), 50 Am. B. P, (N.s.) 499 (1942) (crime to conceal
assets from a receiver as well as from a trustee); Miller v. United States,
125 F. 2d 517 (6th Cir.), 48 Am. B. R. (x.s.) 585 (1942) ; United States v.
Weinbren, 121 F. 2d 826 (2d Cir.), 46 Am. B. R. (m.s.) 730 (1941); United
States v. Martel, 103 F. 2d 343 (2d Cir.), 39 Am. B. R. (N.s.) 659 (1939)(question whether bankrupt owned beneficial interest in corporation); Kutler
v. United States, 79 F. 2d 440 (3d Cir.), 30 Am. B. R (N.s.) 142 (1935)
(indictment insufficient because referees name is mentioned instead of re-
ceiver's) ; Goetz v. United States, 59 F. 2d 511 (7th Cir. 1932) (concealment
of realty interest).
12 Morris Plan v. Henderson, 131 F. 2d 975 (2d Cir.), 51 Am. B. R.
(n.s.) 79 (1942) (no offense unless bankrupt swears to what he knows to be
false); Sharcoff v. Schieffelin, 70 F. 2d 725 (2d Cir. 1934) ; Cohen v. United
States, 36 F. 2d 461 (3d Cir.), 15 Am. B. R. (N.s.) 556, cert. denied, 281
U. S. 742 (1929); Magen v. United States, 24 F. 2d 325 (2d Cir.), 11 Am.
B. P, (N.s.) 573, cert. denied, 277 U. S. 595 (1928) (merchandise unaccounted
for); Grossberger v. Goodrich, 8 F. 2d 964 (6th Cir.), 7 Am. B. R. (x.s.)
294 (1925) (wine, women and gambling); In re Crenshaw, 95 Fed. 634 (D. C.
Ala. 1899) (untrue testimony through mistake) ; Schonfeld v. United States,
277 Fed. 934 (2d Cir. 1921); In re Bergman, 6 F. Supp. 898 (S. D. N. Y.
1934) (elements involved in perjury).
13 Levinson v. United States, 263 Fed. 257 (3d Cir. 1920).1 4 In re Lavery, 235 Fed. 910 (D. C. Mass. 1916) (bankrupt delivers prop-
erty to satisfy state court judgment after bankruptcy).IsIn re Sims, 26 F. Supp. 933 (N. D. W. Va.), 39 Am. B. R. (N.s.) 185
(1939); United States v. Dunkley, 235 Fed. 1000 (N. D. Cal.), 38 Am. B. R.
127 (1916) (extortion); United States v. Five Boro Personal Loan Corp.
(E. D. N. Y. Criminal Docket No. 40139); United States v. Safety Invest-
ment Corp. (indictment filed Sept. 19, 1947 D. C. Minn.) ; cf. Meyer v. Price,
250 N. Y. 370, 13 Am. B. R. (i-.s.) 485 (1929).
16 r re Lenoble, 182 F. 2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1950); United States v. Lynch,
180 F. 2d 696 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U. S. 981 (1950); United States
v. Rosenberg, 145 F. 2d 653 (2d Cir.), 57 Am. B. R. (x.s.) 285 (1944);
United States v. Knickerbocker Fur Coat Co., 66 F. 2d 388 (2d Cir.), 23 Am.
B. IL (N.s.) 598, cert. denied sub. nin., Zuckerkandel v. United States, 290
U. S. 673 (1933); United States v. Zisblatt Furniture Co., 78 F. Supp. 9(S. D. N. Y. 1948), appeal dismissed, 172 F. 2d 740 (2d Cir. 1949); United
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records relating to a bankrupt's property or affairs; 17 (h)
withholding documents relating to a bankrupt's property or
affairs.
At this point it may be appropriate to give you some idea
of the scope of these offenses by directing your attention to
a few of these criminal-bankruptcy cases.
United States v. Lynch 8
A paper mill corporation filed a petition for reorganiza-
tion. The plan failed and the debtor was adjudicated a
bankrupt. When the debtor's petition was originally filed,
the court authorized the debtor to continue business and to
employ the defendant (its secretary and treasurer) at a
salary of $62.50 a week. After adjudication, defendant filed
a report covering the debtor's transactions from which it
appeared that defendant issued debtor's checks totaling
$7,982.33 payable to himself or "cash". During this same
period, the defendant's salary (at $62.50 a week) amounted
to $1,750. Crediting the defendant with this sum and other
deductible items, the overpayments amounted to $4,236.54.
The defendant was indicted, charged with misappropriation
of funds of a bankruptcy estate by an agent of the debtor in
possession. After trial, the jury found him guilty. The
district court upheld the jury's verdict and, later, the court
of appeals affirmed, stating that the jury was justified in
finding that defendant had knowingly and fraudulently ap-
propriated to his own use property of the bankrupt estate.
United States v. Safety Investment Corp.'9
A money-lending institution, a creditor, filed specifica-
tions of objections to a bankrupt's discharge on the ground
States v. Gale, 35 F. Supp. 659 (E. D. N. Y. 1940); United States v. Cole
(-E. D. N. Y. Criminal Docket No. 42498).
17 Somberg v. United States, 71 F. 2d 637 (7th Cir.), 26 Am. B. R. (N.s.)
130 (1934).
IS 180 F. 2d 696 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U. S. 981 (1950).
19 Indictment filed Sept. 19, 1947 D. C. Minn.; United States v. Five Boro




that the bankrupt obtained money on credit by making a
materially false statement in writing respecting his financial
condition. Before the hearing on the objections came on for
trial, the creditor arranged to receive a consideration for the
withdrawal of the objections. The creditor was indicted for
receiving or attempting to obtain remuneration for forbear-
ing to act or proceed on the specifications.
United States v. Walsh 20
Without authorization, a trustee of a bankrupt estate
drew checks for various sums drawn on the trustee's account,
forged the name of the referee whose countersignature on all
checks was required by local rules, cashed the checks and
applied the same to his own personal use. The trustee, in-
dicted for embezzlement and pilferage of property belonging
to the bankrupt estate which came into his possession as
trustee, pleaded guilty.
United States v. Knight 21
In the reorganization proceedings of Central Forge Co.
a plan was approved under which Maxi Manufacturing Co.
was to acquire the debtor's assets for the consideration of
$26,04.33 in cash and $17,000.00 in bonds. After the fees
and expenses of the trustee and his attorney had been ap-
proved by the court and paid to them, the defendants (Maxi
Manufacturing Co.'s attorneys) arranged to have their client
draw a check for 3,000.00, had it cashed, and after deduct-
ing $500.00 for income tax, paid the difference to the trustee
and his attorney. The defendants were indicted for aiding
and abetting the trustee to appropriate property of the bank-
rupt estate and for conspiring with the trustee and others to
divert .3,000.00 of the purchase price of the debtor's assets
to the personal ends of the trustee and his attorney. The
defendants were found guilty. The Supreme Court, in up-
holding the verdict, said in part: 22
20 S. D. N. Y. Criminal Docket No. 126, 1947.
21336 U. S. 505 (1949).
22 Id. at 508.
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All the consideration which is paid for a bankrupt's assets becomes
part of the estate. No device or arrangement, however subtle, can
subtract or divert any of it. It is the substance of the transaction,
not its form, which controls. If that requirement were not rigidly
enforced, control of the plan of reorganization and control of allow-
ances would pass from the Court to the parties. That would subvert
the statutory scheme.
Levinson v. United States 23
In the bankruptcy proceeding of Saunders Shoe Co., one
Levinson (defendant) filed a proof of claim for $18,000.00
for money loaned. The Government charged that the claim
was not for money loaned, but that the money was paid for
purchase of stock. Defendant, indicted for filing false proof
of claim, was convicted.
In addition to the grounds of objections to a bankrupt's
discharge based upon offenses punishable by imprisonment,
Congress, seeking to eliminate certain evils arising from
bankruptcy and its administration, made provision for the
punishment of (a) a receiver, custodian, marshal, trustee or
other officer of the court who appropriates to his own use or
embezzles any property belonging to a bankrupt estate; 24
(b) one who knowingly acts as referee in a cause in which
he is interested, or who, being a referee, receiver, custodian,
trustee, marshal, or other officer of the court, knowingly pur-
chases any property of a bankrupt estate of which he is such
officer, or who, being such officer refuses to permit documents
and accounts to be inspected when directed by the court.25
Also, it is of interest to note that in a prosecution for any
of the foregoing offenses, which may arise in relation to any
type of proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act, it must be
alleged and proven that the offense was knowingly and fraud-
ulently committed.
In addition to the above-mentioned offenses the Borah
Act, which prohibited certain fee-fixing arrangements and
23263 Fed. 257 (3d Cir. 1920).
24 18 U. S. C. § 153 (1948), formerly BANKR. AcT § 29(a) ; United States
v. Goldman, 118 F. 2d 310 (2d Cir. 1941), aff'd, 316 U. S. 129 (1942); Ash-
baugh v. United States 13 F. 2d 591 (6th Cir. 1926) ; United States v. Meagher,
36 F. 2d 824 (D. C. Vont. 1929).
25 18 U. S. C. § 153 (1948), formerly BANxm. Acr § 29(a).
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appointments to be made in bankruptcy proceedings, was re-
pealed but re-enacted as a permanent part of the new Title
18, United States Code.26
The concealment of assets of a bankrupt's (or debtor's)
estate is a continuing offense until bankrupt's discharge is
granted or denied, when the three-year statute of limitations
begins to run.2 7
Of salutary effect is the provision whereby there may be
referred to the United States Attorney the matter of inquir-
ing into and investigating "any violations of the bankruptcy
laws or other laws of the United States relating to insolvent
debtors, receiverships or reorganization plans." The United
States Attorney thereupon conducts the inquiry and reports
to the referee. If the United States Attorney believes an
offense was committed, he presents the matter to the grand
jury. However, if the ends of justice do not require prosecu-
tion, the United States Attorney must report the facts to the
Attorney General for his direction.28
Incidentally, the United States Attorney is entitled to
receive notice of hearing of the bankrupt's application for
discharge and may, in the public interest, file specifications
of objections to the discharge.29
Bankrupts have raised questions as to the invasion of
their constitutional rights. The Supreme Court has upheld
the bankrupt's claim of immunity from testifying 80 but has
required the bankrupt to turn over his books and records,
because title to them passes by operation of law to the trus-
tee in bankruptcy.3'
Another phase of bankruptcy which borders closely on
the question of crime is the summary (turn over) proceeding
instituted by a trustee against a bankrupt, and the contempt
proceedings which usually follow the granting of the "turn
26 18 U. S. C. § 155, 1910 (1948).
27 18 U. S. C. §§ 3282, 3284 (1948).
28 18 U. S. C. § 3057 (1948).
29 11 U. S. C. §32d (1938).
-
0 McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U. S. 34 (1922); 11 U. S. C. § 25a(10)
(1938).
31JI re Fuller, 262 U. S. 91 (1923).
1951 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
over" order. This subject was discussed fully by the Supreme
Court in Maggio v. ZeitzA2
A word or two on the question of evidence. While any
one of the offenses mentioned in this discussion must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal cause, it
should be noted that in bankruptcy, on the hearing on the
specifications of objection to a discharge, the objecting cred-
itor is not required to prove this objection by more than a
preponderance of evidence. 33 Furthermore, even though a
bankrupt may be tried and acquitted on a criminal charge
based on the same allegations of facts as the specifications
of objection, such acquittal has no bearing on the bankruptcy
court's determination of the question of a bankrupt's dis-
charge. On the other hand, a discharge granted a bankrupt
is not res adjudicata in the criminal prosecution of a bank-
rupt for concealment of assets.3 4 But when a bankrupt's ap-
plication for a discharge was opposed upon the ground that
he committed a bankruptcy offense, it was held that the bank-
rupt's conviction for that offense was conclusive proof that
he committed the offense charged, requiring a denial of dis-
charge.3 5 Under the present law, no testimony given by a
bankrupt should be accepted in evidence against him in any
criminal proceeding except such testimony as may have been
given by him in the hearing upon objections to his dis-
charge.3 6
To the question, "Are bankrupts criminals?", it must be
acknowledged at the outset that the percentage of "criminal-
bankrupts" is very small; and, in any event, the answer must
naturally depend upon the facts in each case. While the
bankruptcy law is humane-and generous-in granting dis-
charges and other debtor relief, nevertheless that law and
the correlated provisions of Title 18, United States Code, are
32333 U. S. 56 (1948).
s3 United States v. Greenstein, 153 F. 2d 550 (2d Cir. 1946) ; United States
v. Weinbren, 121 F. 2d 826 (2d Cir. 1941); Arine v. United States, 10 F. 2d
778 (9th Cir. 1926) (charts and summary of record by expert accountant
admissible).
34Douchan v. United States, 136 F. 2d 144 (6th Cir.), 54 Am. B. P.
(N.s.) 148, cert. denied, 319 U. S. 773 (1943).
35In re Gophrener, 20 F. Supp. 922 (E. D. N. Y.), 34 Am. B. R. (Nf.s.)
482 (1937).3611 U. S. C. §25(a) (10) (1938).
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sufficiently adequate to drive the crooked bankrupt out of
the business world by denying his discharge, and by punish-
ing him by imprisonment upon conviction of any of the
enumerated crimes. Giving effect to what has been said, it
is evident that the bankruptcy law, although a statute of
mercy, cancels debts only when justice approves.
It is no mere rhetorical expression and no exaggeration
to say that while the success of bankruptcy administration
depends largely upon the referees in bankruptcy-"the un-
sung heroes of the federal judiciary," 37 commendation in
many cases must also be given to vigilant creditors, credit
associations and their attorneys. And we hasten to sing the
high praises of the judges of the federal courts, the staffs of
the United States Attorney, the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation, and the Federal Grand and Petit Juries. Prompt
and persistent investigations, indictments, prosecutions and
trials have frustrated and defeated the fruition of the
scheming machinations of many an unscrupulous debtor who
has sold himself to the devil. The criminal bankrupt may
flourish 'ike a green bay tree" and even elude the clink of
the prison door closing behind him, but he cannot escape the
agonizing torture of a searing guilty conscience which in
deep profound voice intones over and over again in sonorous
monotone--crime does not pay.
"For what shall it profit a man, if he gain the whole
world, and suffers the loss of his soul?" 38
3 7 Mr. Justice Burton's address reported in 24 J. N. A. REF. BANR. 4
(1950).
38 Mark 8:36.
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